Permanent Mission of Uzbekistan in Geneva

07/09/2026

Regional Approaches to SDG Delivery: What Can Central Asia Offer?
Ahead of the 81st session of the U.N. General Assembly and the 2026 SDG Moment, regional mechanisms for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals are gaining new relevance.
Jakhongir Isaev
The 81st session of the U.N. General Assembly opens on Sept. 8, while world leaders will gather for the SDG Moment on Sept. 18. These events will once again focus attention on how to accelerate progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals in the limited time remaining before 2030.
The U.N.’s 2026 Sustainable Development Goals Report shows that of 139 targets with sufficient trend data, only 36% are on track or making moderate progress. The report emphasizes the need for more investment, technology, data and international cooperation. At the same time, many of the most difficult development challenges are regional, while the main delivery mechanisms remain largely national.
Water basins, electricity grids, transport corridors, air pollution, climate risks and labor markets do not stop at national borders. National plans therefore increasingly need to be complemented by regional coordination, shared data, financing instruments and accountability mechanisms.
Central Asia is beginning to accumulate practical experience in this direction. It would be misleading to present the region as a finished model: serious water, infrastructure and institutional challenges remain. Yet several initiatives advanced in 2026 indicate how a regional layer of SDG implementation can take shape.
In April, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 80/260 on strengthening regional cooperation and economic integration for sustainable development in Central Asia. Supported by the five Central Asian states and 66 co-sponsors, the resolution calls for closer coordination among countries and for U.N. agencies, funds and programs to align their work around regional priorities.
The practical value of this approach is that country programs run by international organizations can be linked around common cross-border outcomes. Water efficiency, clean electricity trade or better transport connectivity can become measurable regional missions around which national reforms and development-partner resources are coordinated.
Energy is already moving in that direction. In January, the World Bank approved the first phase of the Regional Electricity Market Interconnectivity and Trade program. The 10-year initiative aims to establish Central Asia’s first regional electricity market, expand transmission capacity and enable larger-scale renewable-energy integration.
Water cooperation provides another important example. The World Bank estimates that limited coordination among national water systems costs Central Asia more than $4.5 billion a year. In July, it approved a regional project through the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea to strengthen transboundary water management, digitize water accounting and prepare joint infrastructure investments. Around 40 million people are expected to benefit directly or indirectly.
Regional cooperation inevitably requires countries to reconcile different interests — between upstream and downstream states, electricity exporters and importers, transit economies and landlocked countries. For that reason, an effective model also needs mechanisms for benefit-sharing, dispute resolution and transparent monitoring.
Central Asia’s emerging experience suggests four practical lessons for the wider SDG system. First, regional cooperation should focus on specific and measurable missions. Second, multilateral development banks could expand regional financing instruments that reward joint delivery. Third, common standards and interoperable data platforms should be treated as part of regional public infrastructure. Fourth, the U.N. development system can align more of its country-level support around common regional results when dealing with transboundary challenges.
Such an approach does not weaken national sovereignty. On the contrary, it gives governments additional tools to address problems that cannot be solved effectively by one country alone. Regional cooperation also does not replace global cooperation; it serves as an important bridge between global goals and national implementation.
The 2026 SDG Moment emphasizes scaling solutions that have demonstrated results. The mechanisms now emerging in Central Asia are relevant from this perspective because they point to the need to scale not only individual projects, but also the institutions that connect countries, budgets, data and accountability.
In the next phase of the SDGs, greater attention should therefore be given to strengthening practical delivery mechanisms. For many cross-border challenges, regional cooperation can be one of the most effective levels at which this work is organized.
Jakhongir Isaev is Head of Department at the NGO Center for Sustainable Development. He writes on sustainable development, international cooperation and regional policy.

07/09/2026

Uzbekistan Opens a Balkan Gateway to Europe
The Center for Economic Research and Reforms (CERR) examines the prospects for expanding trade, economic and investment cooperation between Uzbekistan and Serbia.
As Uzbekistan broadens its economic engagement with Europe, new avenues for cooperation are emerging. Serbia is becoming one of these promising directions, with its strategic location offering Uzbek businesses additional opportunities to access markets across Central and Southeastern Europe.
For Serbia, closer cooperation with Uzbekistan provides access to Central Asia’s growing market as well as new manufacturing and investment opportunities. This complementarity creates considerable scope for taking bilateral economic relations well beyond their current level.
A New Stage in Economic Relations
Economic ties between Uzbekistan and Serbia have gained significant momentum in recent years. In April 2023, Serbia’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dacic paid an official visit to Uzbekistan.
A major milestone came with the first official visit of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic to Uzbekistan on October 28–31, 2025. Following talks in Tashkent, the two countries signed an Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments and an Agreement on Economic Cooperation.
These agreements established a stronger institutional framework for investment projects and more systematic cooperation between businesses in the two countries.
In May 2026, during a visit by Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Duric, the two sides continued discussions on expanding trade and industrial cooperation. Mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, the chemical industry, agriculture and a number of other sectors were identified among the most promising areas.
The economic rationale for closer cooperation is closely linked to the geographical positions of the two countries and their ability to provide access to broader regional markets.
Serbia lies at the heart of the Balkans, connecting the markets of Central and Southeastern Europe. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, has the largest consumer market in Central Asia and a rapidly expanding industrial base.
This economic complementarity creates opportunities that extend well beyond bilateral trade. For Uzbek businesses, Serbia can serve as a gateway to European markets through the Balkans. For Serbian companies, Uzbekistan offers a platform for expanding their presence across Central Asia.
Trade Is Gaining Momentum
Trade between Uzbekistan and Serbia has expanded rapidly in recent years. Between 2016 and 2025, bilateral trade increased almost ninefold, from $1.4 million to $12 million.

In 2025, Uzbekistan exported $0.9 million worth of goods and services to Serbia, while imports from Serbia exceeded $11 million.
The composition of trade highlights the different nature of the two countries’ supplies.
Food products accounted for the largest share of Uzbekistan’s exports to Serbia at 47%, followed by manufactured goods at 23.8%, services at 20.8%, chemical products at 4.8%, crude materials excluding food at 2.4%, and mineral fuels and lubricants at 1%.
Serbian exports to Uzbekistan, by contrast, are predominantly industrial in nature. Machinery and transport equipment accounted for 50% of imports, followed by chemical products at 20.1% and manufactured goods at 16.8%. Food products represented 4.8%, miscellaneous manufactured articles 4.2%, services 2.6%, and crude materials excluding food 1.5%.
Together, machinery and transport equipment, chemical products and manufactured goods account for 87% of Serbian supplies to Uzbekistan. This predominantly industrial structure creates a solid foundation for developing deeper production cooperation between companies in the two countries.
In 2026, nine enterprises with Serbian capital were operating in Uzbekistan. The cumulative volume of foreign direct investment and loans attracted from Serbia between 2016 and 2025 amounted to $2.2 million.
The next stage of bilateral cooperation could therefore involve a transition toward more sophisticated forms of economic engagement, including contract manufacturing, localization and joint investment projects.
From Trade to Industrial Cooperation
The greatest potential for further cooperation lies in expanding production and investment links between companies in the two countries.
Particularly promising areas include light industry, pharmaceuticals, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, the chemical industry and energy. Opportunities in these sectors include placing manufacturing orders with Uzbek enterprises, localizing production, producing components and implementing joint projects.
Infrastructure represents another promising area. Uzbekistan’s potential participation in railway projects in Serbia is currently being explored. Such cooperation could enable Uzbek companies to expand exports of engineering and construction services and gain experience in implementing projects in European markets.
Serbian companies, in turn, could broaden their participation in infrastructure and industrial projects in Uzbekistan.
Stronger production linkages between enterprises could also increase the involvement of local suppliers from both countries in international value chains.
The new institutional framework, together with investment initiatives and growing industrial cooperation, creates the conditions for bilateral economic relations to move toward a broader and more diversified model.
The Balkan direction could thus become an important route for expanding the presence of Uzbek businesses in Europe, while Uzbekistan could serve as a platform for Serbian companies seeking to establish a long-term presence in Central Asia.
As production ties deepen, companies from Uzbekistan and Serbia may also gain new opportunities to jointly enter third-country markets.
Khurshed Asadov,
Deputy Director of Center for Economic Research and Reforms

04/09/2026

04/09/2026

Tashkent is consistently translating the common principles of the “Shanghai Spirit” into practical mechanisms for cooperation

Deputy Director of the ISRS Bakhtiyor Mustafaev on Uzbekistan’s Key Initiatives at the SCO Bishkek Summit

Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan (ISRS), Bakhtiyor Mustafayev, commented at the request of a correspondent of the Dunyo IA, on the initiatives put forward by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Bishkek on August 31–September 1:
The outcomes of the SCO Summit held in Bishkek, which was attended by President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, are now being widely discussed in the international media and expert community. In this regard, we would like to ask: what place does the SCO occupy in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, and why does Tashkent attach particular importance to this platform?
— For Uzbekistan, the SCO is not a situational diplomatic format, but one of the key areas of its foreign policy. In 2001, Uzbekistan became one of the founding members of the Organization. The Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is located in Uzbekistan, while Central Asia is officially recognized as the geographical and strategic core of the SCO.
Through this platform, Tashkent addresses three closely interconnected objectives: strengthening regional security, expanding the economic connectivity of the continent, and pursuing an open, non-aligned and multi-vector foreign policy.
Uzbekistan’s commitment is reflected not only in political statements, but also in the consistent promotion of practical initiatives. In 2018, at the initiative of the President, the SCO leaders adopted a Joint Appeal to Youth. In Samarkand in 2022, the Uzbek side raised issues of transport connectivity, food security and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In 2023, Uzbekistan proposed the Code of Good-Neighbourliness, Trust and Transboundary Partnership. In 2024–2025, it put forward initiatives aimed at strengthening SCO unity and proposed the concept of a Common Transport Space.
The current proposals continue this line: Tashkent is consistently translating the common principles of the “Shanghai Spirit” into practical mechanisms for cooperation.
You noted that Uzbekistan does not limit itself to political statements and regularly puts forward practical initiatives within the SCO. The Bishkek Summit was no exception: the President proposed developing a vision for “SCO–2040”. Why is such a long-term document needed if the Organization already has a Development Strategy through 2035?
— The Strategy through 2035 primarily addresses the question of what the Organization should accomplish over the medium term. The “SCO–2040: A Space for Common Development” vision is intended to address a more fundamental question: what should the SCO become after this strategy has been implemented? The aim is to move from a set of sector-specific programs toward a common model of an interconnected space, with the movement of investment, technology and knowledge, joint production, and direct links between regions and businesses.
Such a long-term horizon is justified by the scale and diversity of the Organization. The SCO countries account for around 42% of the world’s population and approximately 36% of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms. At the same time, their mutual trade, according to various estimates, has only recently approached $1 trillion. A comparison of these figures highlights the main gap: the SCO’s political and demographic weight still significantly exceeds the depth of its internal economic cooperation.
One of the most practical initiatives presented by the President of Uzbekistan at the Bishkek Summit was the creation of an SCO Industrial Cooperation Map. How can this mechanism turn the Organization’s vast geographical and economic scale into real cross-border production chains?
— The main challenge today is not so much a lack of joint projects as the fragmented nature of information and differences in regulatory conditions. In Uzbekistan alone, more than 1,500 joint projects with SCO countries are currently being implemented. At the same time, businesses still find it difficult to obtain, in one place, systematic information on available industrial sites, raw material resources, potential suppliers, support measures, logistics opportunities and markets across all ten member states. In this context, the SCO Industrial Cooperation Map could serve as a single digital tool, making it easier to identify partners and reducing transaction costs in the preparation and coordination of joint projects.
Its practical impact will depend on the content of the platform. If it includes a verifiable registry of special economic zones, available production capacities, localization requirements, transport tariffs and investment incentives, businesses will be able to build cross-border value chains rather than remain limited to trading raw materials and finished products. This is particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises, which do not have the resources of large corporations to independently study ten different jurisdictions.
Continuing with the economic agenda of the Bishkek Summit, the President of Uzbekistan called for moving from discussions of general principles to the practical launch of the SCO Development Bank. Why does the Organization need its own financial institution, and how can it avoid becoming another bureaucratic structure?
— The SCO has many transport, energy and digital initiatives, but it does not have its own mechanism for turning them into a pipeline of well-prepared and financeable projects. The Interbank Consortium coordinates banks, but it does not replace a development institution with common criteria for project appraisal, co-financing and monitoring. A development bank could fill precisely this institutional gap, particularly when it comes to multinational projects whose benefits and risks are shared among several countries.
Uzbekistan’s proposal is significant because it links the launch of the bank not to the creation of an administrative structure, but to the formation of a portfolio of mature projects in transport, energy, industry and digital infrastructure. This is the right sequence: first, identify the projects, their costs, expected impact and sources of repayment; then determine the bank’s capital and institutional structure. To ensure reliability, the bank would need a transparent procurement policy, independent project assessment, debt sustainability analysis, and the ability to provide financing in different currencies.
A separate part of the President of Uzbekistan’s address in Bishkek focused on artificial intelligence. Why did Tashkent propose creating an Open Multilingual SCO Data Corpus rather than a single language model, and what practical value could it bring to the countries of the Organization?
— Modern artificial intelligence depends not only on computing power, but also on the availability of high-quality data. Most of the languages spoken across the SCO space are significantly underrepresented in global digital datasets compared with English and Chinese. As a result, AI systems have a weaker understanding of local legal, scientific and cultural terminology, while governments and businesses are often forced to rely on products trained on foreign linguistic and contextual data.
An open data corpus could become shared basic infrastructure: standardized texts, speech and translations in the languages of the member states would enable the development of machine translation, education, healthcare, public services and e-commerce applications. This would be a more realistic first step than creating a single SCO model. Each country would be able to develop its own solutions using a compatible shared dataset, while ensuring compliance with relevant legal requirements.
The key conditions would be the protection of personal data, respect for copyright, quality control, and equal representation of the languages of all member states.
Transport connectivity was given considerable attention at the Bishkek Summit. The President of Uzbekistan proposed establishing a Council for the Integration of Railway Systems of the SCO Member States. What practical problems should this Council address, and what would its creation mean for Uzbekistan and Eurasian transit more broadly?
— New railway lines alone do not create a seamless corridor. Differences remain at the borders in technical standards, track gauges, tariffs, electronic document formats, train schedules and control procedures. The Council is intended to serve as a permanent mechanism for coordinating precisely these “connections” between different systems. For Uzbekistan, as a doubly landlocked country, the predictability of transit across several states is no less important than the length of the route itself.
Its practical agenda could include through-tariffs and coordinated schedules, mutual recognition of electronic waybills, synchronization of border-crossing operations, digital cargo tracking, and coordination of investment in bottlenecks. This would help connect the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway with routes through the Caspian Sea, the North–South Corridor, and prospective routes toward South Asia.
The situation in Afghanistan was also an important part of the agenda of the Bishkek Summit. The President of Uzbekistan called for the resumption of regular SCO dialogue with Afghanistan. Why is such dialogue particularly important now, and what role could a restored SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group play?
— The logic behind the proposal is pragmatic: the absence of dialogue does not eliminate threats; rather, it reduces the ability of neighboring countries to manage them. Afghanistan is directly adjacent to the SCO space, and developments in the country have a direct impact on risks related to terrorism, drug trafficking, illicit arms trade, migration and water issues. Isolating the country could only deepen the economic crisis, expand the social base for radicalization and strengthen the shadow economy. At the same time, regular contacts do not imply automatic recognition of the current authorities; they provide a tool for setting conditions, monitoring their implementation and addressing specific security issues.
In the long term, the best way to strengthen security around Afghanistan is to create legitimate sources of income, jobs and sustainable economic interdependence with neighbouring countries within Afghanistan itself.
In 2025, Afghanistan’s foreign trade approached $13.9 billion. Due to disruptions along the Pakistani route, part of the trade flows has already been redirected through Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. If these links are channelled into legitimate trade, energy, transport and infrastructure projects, greater economic engagement can help reduce the space for extremism and smuggling.
To conclude our discussion of the initiatives put forward at the Bishkek Summit, we should also mention the President of Uzbekistan’s proposal for a program on preserving traditional arts and intangible cultural heritage for 2028–2030. Why does the SCO need a separate program in this area, and what practical results could it deliver?
— The SCO brings together states with different political systems and interests, so its long-term cohesion cannot rely solely on intergovernmental agreements. Traditional arts, crafts, music, oral traditions and cultural festivals create horizontal ties between societies and help shape a shared cultural space while preserving national identities and differences.
In practical terms, the program could include joint registries and digital archives, restoration and research projects, festivals, exchange programs for traditional artisans, youth training, and cultural tourism routes. For Uzbekistan, this would serve both as an instrument of cultural diplomacy and as a means of supporting regional economies: traditional crafts contribute to employment, small businesses and cultural tourism.
During his visit to Bishkek, the President of Uzbekistan also took part in the “SCO Plus” meeting, which focused on the role of the United Nations in shaping a fairer multipolar world order. How could the model of cooperation proposed by Uzbekistan between the UN, regional organizations and individual states improve the effectiveness of international cooperation without creating new dividing lines? And what practical role could the “SCO Plus” format play in this process?
— The central message of the address is that the emergence of a multipolar world should not lead to the weakening of universal international institutions or to the creation of competing geopolitical blocs. The UN should retain its central coordinating role and uphold common principles of international cooperation, while regional organizations should complement its efforts by adapting global decisions to the specific conditions, capacities and needs of individual regions. Such an approach would combine the universal legitimacy of the UN with the practical capabilities of regional organizations, thereby strengthening the effectiveness and manageability of the international system.
It is precisely in this context that the “SCO Plus” format is proposed as a bridge between states, regional organizations and global institutions. It could serve as a platform for coordinating various initiatives in areas such as sustainable development, advanced technologies, climate adaptation, education, healthcare and youth empowerment. The proposed Network of Regional Organizations would help systematize such cooperation, facilitate the exchange of experience and jointly promote solutions within the UN framework. An open bank of interregional projects and technologies, in turn, would help translate political agreements into concrete programs that contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.
At the same time, Uzbekistan links the effectiveness of international cooperation to tangible results for states, businesses and citizens: greater access to markets, the development of cross-border corridors, increased investment and the wider use of modern technologies. The proposal to transform “SCO Invest” into a permanent platform is aimed at addressing precisely this objective.
At the same time, the establishment of the “SCO Plus” Forum of Cultures and Civilizations in Khiva is intended to give cooperation a broader societal and humanitarian foundation. In this way, Tashkent is proposing a model of open multipolarity in which the strategic autonomy of states is strengthened not through isolation, but through greater connectivity, complementarity of initiatives, and an expansion of points of contact between countries and regions.

04/09/2026

Uzbekistan and the Republic of Korea: From Investment Partnership to Technological Cooperation

Uzbek–Korean relations are entering a new stage of development. While trade, investment and equipment supplies previously formed the foundation of bilateral ties, the emphasis is now shifting towards deeper industrial and technological cooperation.
The development of joint production and technology chains, the localisation of high-tech manufacturing, the advanced processing of critical mineral resources, and human capital development are emerging as key areas of bilateral cooperation. This trajectory is aligned with the long-term priorities of both countries.
The Republic of Korea seeks to diversify its sources of raw materials and enhance the reliability of supply. Uzbekistan, in turn, is interested in expanding domestic resource processing, adopting advanced technologies, and increasing the value added generated within the country. The complementarity of these objectives provides a basis for moving from predominantly investment-based cooperation towards a comprehensive industrial and technological partnership.
In 2025, bilateral trade amounted to approximately $1.8 billion. In August 2026, the two governments established a joint working group tasked with increasing annual trade turnover to $4 billion in the near term.
Investment cooperation has assumed an even greater scale. The cumulative volume of Korean investment attracted to Uzbekistan’s economy has exceeded $10 billion, including approximately $8 billion in foreign direct investment. The presence of Korean businesses is also expanding. Today, around 1,000 enterprises with Korean capital operate in the country, compared with 359 in 2019.
The investment base accumulated over the years has been translated into a number of major projects. The most significant is the Uz-Kor Gas Chemical joint venture, valued at approximately $4 billion — the largest investment project in the history of bilateral relations. The enterprise produces polyethylene, polypropylene and commercial gas for the domestic market and export.
The automotive industry occupies a prominent place in bilateral cooperation. In partnership with Kia Corporation, the ADM Jizzakh plant manufactures a broad range of vehicles using semi-knock-down assembly. Enterprises within the UzAuto Components network manufacture components for UzAuto Motors vehicles, including air-conditioning systems, seats, stamped parts and plastic components.
Industrial cooperation also extends to the textile sector. Posco International Group enterprises in the Fergana and Bukhara regions process cotton fibre and export high-quality yarn and fabrics to European and Asian markets.
Cooperation is also developing in the pharmaceutical industry. At the Tashkent Pharma Park cluster, Korean companies are participating as investors and technology providers in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products in accordance with international Good Manufacturing Practice standards.
The broadening sectoral scope of cooperation is creating the conditions for a transition from individual investment projects to sustainable production linkages between enterprises in the two countries.
Why Cooperation Is Acquiring a New Quality
Deeper industrial and technological cooperation is being driven by changes in the global economy. Geopolitical uncertainty, trade restrictions and the restructuring of global supply chains have increased the importance of economic security.
This issue is particularly relevant for the Republic of Korea. Its leading industries — electronics, semiconductors, automotive manufacturing and battery production — depend on stable supplies of raw materials, materials and components.
The country ranks third globally in electronics manufacturing and is a leader in the memory-chip segment. It accounts for approximately 13–15 per cent of the global semiconductor market. The Republic of Korea is also among the world’s seven largest automobile manufacturers and the three global leaders in battery technology.
The reliance of its key industries on imports is prompting Seoul to broaden its economic partnerships and diversify its supply base for raw materials, processed materials and components. Against this backdrop, Central Asia is assuming greater importance as a resource-rich region seeking to advance its industrial modernization.
At the same time, Uzbekistan is placing greater emphasis on the quality of incoming investment. At the present stage, not only the volume of investment but also its technological impact is becoming increasingly important. The principal focus is on establishing new production facilities, expanding domestic processing, strengthening export capacity and training qualified personnel.
The convergence between the Republic of Korea’s need for reliable sources of raw materials and Uzbekistan’s aspiration to develop their advanced processing lends particular importance to cooperation in critical minerals.
From Raw-Material Trade to Value Chains
Uzbekistan possesses reserves of copper, tungsten, lithium, molybdenum, zinc and other strategically important resources. For the Republic of Korea, these resources are of interest as an important component of the raw-material base for high-tech industries.
For Tashkent, the priority is not simply to expand raw-material exports, but to progressively deepen their processing within the country. In this regard, a promising model would integrate resource extraction, processing, the manufacture of intermediate products and their subsequent industrial use into a single value chain.
This approach serves the interests of both sides. It would enable the Republic of Korea to diversify its sources of strategic raw materials and enhance supply-chain resilience. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, would be able to expand processing, master new technological processes and increase the share of high-value-added products.
The localisation of individual stages of the technological cycle in Uzbekistan is becoming particularly important. The greater the number of production operations carried out within the country, the more substantial the benefits for industry, employment and the training of national specialists.
Thus, the traditional model of cooperation, based primarily on supplies of raw materials and equipment, is gradually being complemented by a model centred on the joint creation of value added.

Technology, Financing and Human Capital
The development of production chains requires not only investment, but also technology, long-term financing and qualified personnel. The combination of these elements could become one of the principal strengths of the Uzbek–Korean partnership.
The financial and institutional framework required to deepen cooperation is already taking shape. Under the partnership with the Republic of Korea’s Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), the ceiling for concessional financing available to Uzbekistan has been raised to $2 billion. The funds are being channelled into projects in digitalisation, healthcare, education and infrastructure.
Additional opportunities are provided by the Export-Import Bank of Korea. It helps finance the acquisition of Korean industrial equipment through credit lines extended to Uzbek banks. Export credit insurance mechanisms also facilitate the mobilisation of bank financing for joint initiatives.
These financial instruments are complemented by expanding technological cooperation. In August 2026, the two sides intensified their engagement in artificial intelligence and digital transformation. With the support of the National Information Society Agency of the Republic of Korea (NIA), cooperation is developing in digital government, data standardization and the introduction of AI solutions.
For Uzbekistan, this work is important not only in terms of the digitalization of individual sectors. The standardization of production data, automation and the application of artificial intelligence can increase productivity and lay the groundwork for the development of modern smart manufacturing.
Human capital development remains an equally important component. Branches of four South Korean universities operating in Uzbekistan — Yeoju, Inha, Bucheon and Kimyo International University — train engineers, IT specialists and technologists for emerging sectors of the economy.
This educational dimension is complemented by the organised employment of Uzbek specialists in the Republic of Korea under the Employment Permit System (EPS). Employment at Korean industrial and shipbuilding enterprises enables them to acquire practical skills and become familiar with modern manufacturing practices.
The significance of this mechanism is gradually extending beyond labour mobility. If the acquired competencies are used effectively, it could become an important channel for transferring industrial expertise and professional knowledge.
The combination of financial instruments, technology and human capital development is creating the foundation required for deeper industrial cooperation.
From Bilateral Partnership to a Regional Dimension
The integration of Uzbek–Korean cooperation into the broader agenda between the Republic of Korea and Central Asia opens up additional opportunities.
The first summit between the Republic of Korea and the five Central Asian states is scheduled to take place in Seoul on 16–17 September 2026. The new format reflects Seoul’s growing interest in the region as a promising area for industrial, technological and resource cooperation.
This creates additional opportunities for Uzbekistan. The country possesses a sizeable domestic market, considerable demographic potential, a substantial resource base and a developing industrial sector. Its accumulated experience of cooperation with Korean businesses and financial institutions constitutes another significant advantage.
Taken together, these factors enable Uzbekistan to position itself as one of the leading platforms for the Republic of Korea’s industrial and technological cooperation with Central Asia.
The consistent development of production chains, localisation of technologies and training of qualified personnel could make Uzbek–Korean cooperation a notable example of the transition from an investment partnership to industrial and technological cooperation in Central Asia.
Chief Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies (ISRS) under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (ISRS), Doctor of Economics
Dmitry Trostyansky