09/30/2025
When U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met in Washington, Gaza, the prisoners, and the truce dominated the headlines. Yet behind closed doors, Sweida emerged as a file that encapsulates the tragedy of minorities and exposes the outlines of the new regional balance. For months, Jabal al-Druze has been enduring a suffocating siege: scarcity of food and medicine, constant power outages, and an unannounced but de facto self-administration backed by a discourse of dignity and the right to self-determination.
The humanitarian corridor has become the issue of the moment. Israel views it as an existential necessity, while the al-Joulani regime rejects it as a violation of sovereignty. Trump revived the language of the Abraham Accords, suggesting that the spirit of those agreements could extend to southern Syria, and that partial settlements—from the humanitarian corridor to self-rule—might be a first step toward a new Middle East. In this sense, Sweida becomes a testing ground for moving from rigid centralization to decentralization under international guarantees.
The American dimension is no less significant. In Congress, voices are calling for the extension and tightening of the Caesar Act, closing any loophole for the al-Joulani regime. Some lawmakers went further, urging a review of any ties with that regime after the massacres in Sweida proved that no reform is possible within its structure. Thus, American economic pressure converges with Israeli security pressure, placing Sweida at the heart of an equation larger than itself.
What makes the scene unique is that it is not purely Syrian. International precedents bolster the legitimacy of Sweida’s bid for self-rule. Iraqi Kurdistan, for example, was born out of siege and war, and with international support evolved into a region with broad powers within a unified Iraq. Bosnia, after the Dayton Accords, was effectively divided into parallel political entities, protecting pluralism and preventing explosion despite fragility. Even South Sudan, which ended in secession, passed through stages of autonomy under regional and international supervision. These examples are not identical replicas, but they affirm that Sweida’s option is no illusion—it is part of a global trajectory that re-engineers states after wars on the basis of pluralism and decentralization.
The possible roadmap is clear: first, secure the humanitarian corridor with international guarantees; then transform the National Guard into a dual civil-security framework providing both services and protection; next, establish an international protection mechanism similar to buffer zones; and ultimately incorporate the Sweida model into a comprehensive constitutional settlement. These steps are not political luxuries but conditions for the survival of a besieged community refusing to remain a perpetual victim of regional power games.
The link between Gaza and southern Syria is no coincidence. If Washington and Tel Aviv succeed in protecting a small minority through humanitarian and political arrangements, they will present a new model of security—one based on power-sharing and safeguarding pluralism, not reproducing authoritarianism under new names. This is what the al-Joulani regime fears, because Sweida’s success would mean the practical end of the illusion of absolute centralization and the beginning of an era shaped by local communities with external support, not decrees from closed capitals.
History will not wait long. Leaving Sweida to starve under siege means minorities remain bargaining chips, while rejecting local governance repeats the equation that ignited the Syrian war. Trump insists that the Abraham Accords changed the face of the Middle East, but the true test is whether that spirit extends to Jabal al-Druze. Only then could the suffering of a besieged mountain turn into the beginning of a new phase—where the walls of centralization crumble as the wall of normalization once did, and where Sweida writes its own chapter in the book of the new Middle East.
Dr. Ashraf Al- Ammatori
