10/07/2018
The Irish Times Wed, Jul 18, 2001
The Truce which ended the War of Independence should have removed the gun from Irish politics. By 1921 the Volunteers were conducting a guerrilla campaign with the authority of Dail Eireann. Never again, despite its claims, would the IRA have this legitimacy.
After King George V's conciliatory speech at the opening of the Northern Parliament in June, the British government proposed a peace conference. The prime minister, David Lloyd George, invited Eamon de Valera, "as the chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland", and Sir James Craig, the Northern premier.
By Irish standards casualty figures were horrific. In 1920-21 the crown forces suffered 525 dead, and almost 1,000 wounded. More than 700 civilians were killed between January and July 1921.
Prof David Fitzpatrick wrote in Politics and Irish Life, 1913-1921: "By mid-1921 the IRA had reached an impasse. Despite its vast improvement as a fighting force since the days of close-order drilling after Sunday Mass, it was too poorly armed to have much hope of dislodging the enemy from his heavily fortified strongholds . . . But the opposing forces, and the government behind them, had also reached an impasse. On July 11th, 1921, both sides acknowledged defeat by agreeing to a Truce." There could be no military victory.
On July 8th, at the close of discussions with Southern unionists (Craig had refused to attend), de Valera telegraphed Lloyd George that he was ready to meet him. He insisted, however, on a preliminary cessation. At first the British government refused but Lord Midleton intervened and secured Lloyd George's consent to a suspension of hostilities. Gen Jan Christian Smuts arrived in Dublin to speak to de Valera about the compromise which had ended the Boer War and of the relations established between South Africa and the British Commonwealth.
Gen Sir Nevil Macready, commander of the British forces, was invited to the Mansion House. The terms of the Truce were agreed and came into effect at noon on Monday, July 11th. Craig remarked: "It now merely remains for Mr de Valera and the British people to come to terms regarding that area outside of that of which I am prime minister."
The summer of 1921 was remarkable for sunshine and euphoria. It seemed like victory: an end to curfew, freedom to walk at night in the streets, shout "Up the Republic" and sing The Soldier's Song. The men of the flying columns were welcomed home by rejoicing crowds.
The number of Volunteers multiplied the instant fighting stopped. The Clare guerrilla leader, Michael Brennan, denounced the noisy patriots "who kept under the bed while the war was on". In the succeeding months ill-feeling increased between the fighters and the "flagwaggers", which ultimately pitted brother against brother.
The crown forces were humiliated during the Truce. The RIC, though eventually permitted to carry arms in the martial law area, was instructed to coexist with the rival republican police. The British army, whose leaders believed victory was just around the corner, felt "humiliation and disappointment" at this act of betrayal - feelings quickly superseded by "intense pleasure at the thought of a speedy and permanent departure from Ireland".
The Truce was marked by numerous martial displays on both sides, although few violent clashes were reported. Military intelligence said north Munster loyalists viewed the peace proposals "with horror" and had decided to "clear out of the country" if they were implemented.
Northern unionism reacted violently to the prospect of peace with Sinn Fein. The day before the Truce was remembered in Belfast as Bloody Sunday. Orange mobs and special constables attacked Catholic districts, killing 15 people, seriously injuring 68 and burning 161 houses.
When the Anglo-Irish talks foundered, Michael Collins was sent to London to lead the Irish delegation. On December 6th, he and the other delegates signed an agreement which led to the foundation of the Irish Free State. The Dail ratified the Treaty by a narrow majority. De Valera resigned and attached himself to the coattails of the unconstitutional republicans, investing them with an authority they would not otherwise have possessed. The IRA split into two increasingly hostile forces: one - which became the constitutionally legitimate Oglaigh na hEireann - committed to defending the nascent State, the other dedicated to its destruction.
The anarchy unleashed by the anti-Treatyites was, according to Collins, undermining the confidence of the nation in itself: "When left to ourselves we could show nothing of the native civilisation we had claimed as our own . . . If we wish to make our nation a free and a great and a good nation we can do so now. But we cannot do it if we are to fight among ourselves as to whether it is to be called Saorstat or Poblacht."
Furthermore, the opposition of de Valera and his followers to the Treaty was prejudicing the chances of unity. "As the division in our ranks has become more apparent, the attitude of Sir James Craig has hardened. The organised ruffianism of the North-East has broken out afresh." Collins saw the Northern question as "this serious internal problem which argues for the attainment of the final steps of freedom by evolution rather than by force".
Fratricidal strife tore the heart out of the revolution. Enthusiasm for the language was replaced by compulsory Irish. The vacuum created by the discredited left was filled by an authoritarian church. Moreover, the defeated republicans dumped rather than laid down arms.
This pike-in-the-thatch syndrome contributed to the cycle of violence which has overshadowed the country since Partition.
Brendan O Cathaoir is a historian and Irish Times journalist
