08/16/2026
Complaint of Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei and Its Impact on the 1905 Decision to Transfer Abyei to Kordofan
By: Lual Kual Lual
When we read the history of Abyei and the surrounding areas, we often arrive at 1905 as a pivotal year in the question of administrative affiliation. However, to better understand what happened that year, we need to return to the documents written by the Anglo-Egyptian administration at the time, rather than relying solely on narratives and interpretations that emerged many years later.
Among the most important of these documents are Sudan Intelligence Report No. 127 (SIR No. 127) for February 1905 and Report No. 128 (SIR No. 128) for March of the same year. When the two reports are read together, they reveal a story worth examining. It begins with a complaint submitted by Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei and, only weeks later, ends with an administrative decision placing Sheikh Rehan, Sultan Rob/Arop Biong, and their respective areas under the administration of Kordofan.
On 29 January 1905, Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei, whom the documents describe as the sheikh of the Toj/Tweit area, submitted a complaint to Bimbashi Baildon. His complaint concerned a raid on his area by a group of Hamar Arabs led by Sheikh Ali Jalla.
The document states that the group was armed with approximately 15 rifles and a number of spears, and that its members claimed they had come to collect cattle on behalf of the government. It is important to be careful when reading this statement: the document does not say that the government had actually sent them. Rather, it records that they claimed to be acting in its name.
For Sheikh Rehan, however, this was not simply an isolated incident. He decided to travel personally to the government authorities to explain what had happened and request their intervention.
This is where one of the most interesting details in the report begins.
Rehan's journey took approximately 23 days before he reached Taufiqia, today known as Doleib, which was the capital of Upper Nile before Malakal. From there, he continued to Kodok/Fashoda, and was subsequently sent to Khartoum. According to the report, he arrived in Khartoum on 26 February 1905.
We can imagine how difficult such a journey must have been at the time, particularly for a sheikh coming from an area far from the main administrative centres. Nevertheless, he travelled all that distance because he wanted his community's complaint to reach the central authorities.
When he reached Khartoum, his complaint was not merely about cattle. According to the report, he stated that approximately 16 young men from the Twij/Dinka community had been captured while hunting and taken into the territories of the Hamar.
This point makes the story of Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei even more significant. He was not travelling to Khartoum simply to discuss a minor cattle dispute. He was reporting a raid and the capture of members of his community, and asking the government to intervene to protect them and address the problem.
The following report, SIR No. 128, issued in March 1905, then presents the most important development.
After recording Rehan's complaint in the previous report, the administration stated that a decision had been made that Sultan Arop Biong, whose country lay along the Kir River, and Sheikh Rehan of Twij, should be placed under the administration of Kordofan.
This makes the chronology particularly striking.
A man from the Twij area suffers a raid, travels to Taufiqia (Doleib), then to Kodok, and finally to Khartoum to present his complaint. Shortly afterwards, the administrative records contain a decision placing him, together with Sultan Arop Biong, under Kordofan administration.
Does this mean that Rehan's complaint and the capture of the 16 young men were the direct reasons for the transfer of Abyei to Kordofan?
I believe the answer requires caution and careful consideration.
It is difficult to argue that the capture of the young men alone caused the decision, because SIR 128 does not identify that incident as the sole reason. Instead, it speaks more broadly of repeated complaints concerning raids carried out by Arabs from southern Kordofan against these communities.
This means that the problem existed before Rehan's complaint and that the administration was dealing with an ongoing security problem rather than a single incident.
At the same time, however, it is equally difficult to ignore the importance of Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei's complaint. It came at a time when the administration was seeking a way to address the problem, the complaint reached Khartoum directly, and the administrative decision followed shortly afterwards.
Therefore, the most balanced interpretation is that Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei's complaint was a direct and important factor in the circumstances that led to the decision, and may have been the spark that accelerated it, but it was not the only factor.
The reason given by the administration for the decision was primarily administrative and security-related. The communities experiencing the raids were administratively connected to Bahr el Ghazal, while the Arab groups accused of attacking them were connected to Kordofan. For the colonial administration, dealing with a conflict between groups under two different administrative authorities was difficult.
The government therefore considered that placing both sides under a single governor could help it control the situation and address the conflicts.
It is also important to remember that the decision did not concern Sheikh Rehan alone. It also included Sultan Arop Biong, whom the document describes as controlling territory along the Kir River. It would have been difficult to transfer Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei's administration to Kordofan without including Sultan Arop Biong, especially since Sheikh Rehan's territory did not directly border the Hamar.
This gives us the impression that the administration was dealing with a situation much broader than Sheikh Rehan's personal complaint. It was undertaking an administrative reorganisation of entire areas and communities at a time when the administration itself was still trying to understand the geography of the region, particularly its rivers and natural boundaries.
This is why the Kir River is also important when reading the documents of that period. At the same time, the administration was gathering geographical information about the region. This demonstrates that the 1905 administrative decision was not isolated from the government's broader efforts to understand and control the region administratively.
When we arrange the events simply, the picture becomes clearer:
29 January 1905: Sheikh Rehan submitted his complaint.
February 1905: SIR 127 recorded his long journey and his complaint in Khartoum, including his statement concerning the capture of approximately 16 young men from Twij.
26 February 1905: Sheikh Rehan arrived in Khartoum.
March 1905: SIR 128 recorded the decision to place Sultan Arop Biong and Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei of Twij under Kordofan administration.
This chronology makes Sheikh Rehan's complaint a very important part of the story surrounding the 1905 decision.
However, we should avoid saying that “the capture of 16 young men was what caused the transfer of Abyei to Kordofan,” because the documents do not state this explicitly.
A more accurate formulation would be that Sheikh Rehan's complaint was one of the most important and immediate links in the chain of events preceding the decision, at a time when the administration was already facing a recurring problem of raids and security disputes between local communities and Arabs from southern Kordofan.
In my view, this is the most important aspect of the story.
The documents do not merely tell us about an administrative decision made in 1905. They also reveal that a local leader, Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei, personally attempted to reach the government and seek its intervention. He travelled a long distance, through Taufiqia and Kodok, until he reached Khartoum, carrying with him the complaint of his community.
Weeks later, an administrative decision was issued that changed the area's administrative affiliation.
Thus, reading SIR 127 and SIR 128 together gives us a more human and historical picture of what happened: a complaint from a local community, a long journey to the centre of power, an attempt by the administration to address a security problem, and finally a decision to reorganise the area's administrative affiliation.
In the end, we should not reduce the events of 1905 to a single political statement. The documents are more complex than that and deserve to be read within their full historical context, while distinguishing between what the administration actually said at the time and the political interpretations that emerged later.
Most importantly, these contemporary documents speak about Sultan Arop Biong and Sheikh Rehan Gorkwei, rather than the interpretations and names later imposed upon these events. Therefore, returning to the original text of the reports, together with the administrative and geographical reports of 1905, remains the best way to understand how and why the administrative status of the area changed that year.
In short: Sheikh Rehan's complaint alone did not create the 1905 decision, but it was an important and direct link in the events that preceded it, and may have been the moment that prompted the administration to accelerate the reorganisation of the area under Kordofan administration.
